

# INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT: Relationship of Philippine Communist Party  
 With Chinese Communists in the Philippines  
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The following report is based on an analysis of available documentary information on the Chinese Board, or Branch, of the Philippine Communist Party. In effect, it is a study of the relationship of the Philippine Communist Party with Chinese Communists in the Philippines.

The Communist documents from which this information has been abstracted were confiscated in the Government raids on Communist centers in Manila in October 1950. While some of the references go back to 1948 and earlier, most of the documents apparently were written during 1949 and 1950. Several of the documents were dated as recently as September 1950. Most of the documents are communications between high level Party and HMB leaders, or communications to and from Party elements on the national level.

1. The Chinese section of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is referred to as CB. At one point this abbreviation is identified as "Chinese Branch"; at another point CB apparently stands for "Chinese Board". In any event, CB refers to the Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines.
2. It is difficult to establish the precise position of the Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines. That it theoretically is a branch of the CPP is apparent from a statement in a "Party Work Summary" prepared by a Chinese:

.....in classifying the Chinese section with that of the Filipinos as "host" and "guest", the CB failed to hold firm that the constitutional structure of the Chinese Party is being a part of the organ of the CPP. In the consequence of this failure, the proper relationship between them was mechanically set apart. It had lacked the concrete and practical application of on one hand, how to effect the necessity of the Chinese Party to be led and propelled by the CPP, and on the other, how to use the excellent tradition which the Chinese Party had possessed from the CPP and the Chinese Revolution for the CPP; that is to say, to assist and be the model unit of the CPP.

3. It thus appears that the CB was considered a branch of the CPP, but that the CB had set for itself the goal of serving as the model for the CPP. Despite this understanding on the higher party levels that the CB was a branch of

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the CPP, it is probable that closer relationships were maintained between CB and the Communist Party of China (CPC) than between CB and the CPP. The following quotation from a document illustrates this:

In the work of mobilizing comrades and followers back to China to join the officer training class, it (CB) lacked a complete, over-all plan and concrete organizational measures. It did not establish the right concept of back to China. It did not mobilize our whole Party to discuss this problem fully. When the general sentiment of back to China was created, the leading organ then felt hard to meet the situation. Therefore many comrades went back to China without permission. Some, not materializing their wish of back to China, became discontented and talkative.

4. It seems probable that the Chinese influence was dominant during the early Hukbalahap days, but that this influence waned with the progress of the CPP toward solidification of its party structure and policies. HMB leader, Luis M. Taruc, commented on Chinese participation in the Hukbalahap movement as follows:

In the question of tactics of offence and defense, I noticed from the start a premature over-zealous desire for continuous attacks on the enemy by our Chinese comrades-advisors. As Com. Tandang Bie put it, "I cannot understand this unsystematic offensive being ordered. It is a serious waste of manpower and ammunition, without thinking of the future struggle after the defeat of the Japs." I had an inkling later that the no-let-up offensive urged upon the Huk by our Chinese advisors was motivated by a national opportunism, taking into their consideration the effect on their "home" front of any anti-Japanese offensive we had waged locally. Expansion was lightly taken, even after the Wa Chi<sup>2</sup> succeeded in penetrating deep into Southern Luzon. Headed by the Political Commissar himself (Com. Tony) they reached only until Abo of Angat, a distance of one day and one night walk from the Candaba Swamp.

5. The account book of the National Finance Committee records a 30 April 1950 receipt of P220.00 from "CB - Tony". The log books of the National Communications Department show that in July 1950, CB was receiving three copies of the party publication, Titig, and the distribution list of the Education Department (ED) (IN) includes "CB c/o Tony". It is possible that this is the same Tony who was leading the Wa Chi Guerrillas in 1942-1943.
6. The disastrous adventurist policy, advocated by the Chinese during the early months of the Japanese occupation, of actively engaging the Japanese in combat apparently caused the CPP to become disenchanted with its Chinese advisors, and it appears that the Chinese have never regained their lost prestige. The Secretariat, in a decision of 13 March 1950, reported as follows:

Heard report on CB. Many CBs want to go back home. Our drive is to make them stay here either to work legally or go out in the field with the HMB. CB will drop from their membership those who go back home without their consent. Lower organs of CB in the provinces already instructed to coordinate with our own lower organs. Those in Bicol and Visayas will send their contributions to the CB which we will send to our own organizations in those regions. Considering developments in the situation, decided to instruct our lower organs to draw the masses of the CB to sympathize with the movement, to solicit contributions from them, etc., but before actually approaching them in the name of the movement, report them first to the SEC which will get a list of CB members

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as well as members of their mass organizations. Purpose of this is to prevent our own members from approaching members of CB. There are around 170,000 CBs here, and CB membership is only 200. Evasion of struggle and extreme underground is prevalent.

7. Apparently CB did not provide statistics regarding membership, because on 28 July 1950, the Secretariat decided as follows:

Require CB to furnish SEC with its complete organizational statistics not later than end of September, to enable SEC to formulate more concrete plans for guidance of CB.

8. The figure of 200 members, quoted above, seems so small that there might be reason for questioning its authenticity. However, the figure is given some credence by statements appearing in a document entitled "Brief Report of Our Work Within One Year (1948-1949)", which unquestionably was prepared by the Chinese Branch:

Organization Work: During this period of one and one half years, we have accomplished the following: United our present comrades, maintained revolutionary base, consolidated our organization, picked up six disconnected comrades and eleven red temporarily disconnected comrades. With the utilization of vocational organization, cultural and musical activities, studying and reading unit we have united a great number of democratic people here. Absorbed three new comrades.

9. If, during a period of one and one half years, the recruiting of three new members is considered an "accomplishment", then a total membership of 200 is an entirely credible figure.
10. There were certain matters which the Secretariat (SEC) did not discuss freely in its transmissions to other Political Bureau (PB) members (e.g. Intelligence and Economic Struggle). It is possible that coordination with CB was another subject which SEC was reluctant to discuss. Taruc, at least, demonstrated a considerable ignorance regarding CB. On 10 December 1949, he sent the following query to the SEC:

How is our connection with the CB now? Any news from the outside? Can the CB give proper contact for a comrade student to the Party there who will pose as a tourist or student on the way?

On 22 July 1950, Taruc made the following suggestion regarding Com. Magusig (who had been paralyzed):

I would add in the case of Com. Magusig that aside from the Organization Bureau (OB) and SEC exhausting all available expert services locally, all means must be exhausted to try his chances of being sent to China or the Soviet Union for (a) treatment (b) giving him assignment to learn all services our Party needs when we hold power.

11. From two documents authored by Taruc during July and August 1950 are selected the following comments which demonstrate his interest in making use of facilities he thought available through coordination with the Chinese:

Let us select some 12 cadres of HMB to be "puslit" to China before December (1950)--to train there or in Korea and Viet Nam-- and return after 6 or 10 months. We might find a way along coastal line of Peco 2.\*\*\*

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The HMB and the CB must make a very close coordination in organizing the masses in all strategic regions.....Special Committees to procure arms and ammunition through various means must be organized. Every RC with ideal coastal lines must create special units to be ready at any time for any assignment "outside". Comrades assigned in these units must first befriend closely the sea-faring people of the area and join "practice trips" to the sea at every opportunity. Work as deck-hands in any sea-going fishing boat if possible - strictly avoiding exposure. We must recruit or ask CB for Chinese comrades who can serve as guide-interpreters. We must do this before the end of December 1950.

12. On the occasion of the eight anniversary of the HMB (29 March 1950), CB addressed a letter to the "Commanders, Rank and File of People's Liberation Army", reading, in part, as follows:

On this great occasion of Philippine People's Liberation Army eighth anniversary, we wish to extend our sincere and earnest assurance of closer cooperation with the People's Liberation Army, to fight for the liberation of world's proletarian and realization of international peace and democracy.

The letter was signed:

Philippines Communist Party Chinese Board  
Philippines Chinese Labor Association  
Philippine Chinese Employee Cooperative Association  
Chinese Democratic Youth League Philippine Branch

The Chairman of the Organizational Bureau added the following footnote to the letter:

Don't publish the names of organizations above; in any publication we should sign The Chinese Community in the Philippines.

13. On 24 September 1950, the CPP addressed a letter to the Comrades of the CPC which reads, in part, as follows:

The Communist Party of the Philippines, through its Central Committee, is sending its own greetings, as well as those of the revolutionary national liberation movement it is leading, to the heroic people of your country who, under your guidance, have already established the New People's Democratic Republic, whose first anniversary you are celebrating.

We close with the suggestion that a regional conference of Communist Parties of Asia-Pacific countries be called by your Party, similar to the European Cominform, so that a regional coordinated strategy can be formulated and implemented.

The letter signed in the name of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines, may have been written by Jose Lava.

14. In a report of its accomplishments during 1948 and 1949, the CB makes a few statements which are revealing on the status of the Party during that period. Although the report, as a whole, lacks coherence, the selected portions form a fair picture:

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The Fourth Convention was not able to guide the whole party toward thought reformation and stabilization of our organization, but unfortunately became the stage of mutual charges and dispute. Many practical problems were not reasonably settled. Although the directive organ was finally elected, after the closing of the convention, morale was low. Many comrades, under different pretexts left our party. At that time, the small-bourgeoisie was dominating our party. It destroyed the solemnity of our organization; it destroyed our democratic-centralized system and our iron discipline; it promoted the growth of individualism and sectionalism; it created an extremely democratic anarchic state within our party.

In October, 1948, there happened the "Unson Case" which shocked the whole Chinese community. Some of our uniform and disappointed comrades voluntarily asked our party to stop his connection. Some stopped their connection and took their own way. At that time, the directive organ did not act quickly to eliminate the undesirable element, as well as to hold firmly to good comrades to maintain the work. We overestimated the force of our enemy and concentrated our attention on removing the targets from the enemy. The directive organ planned to formulate an entirely secret party and decided to retreat the "too red" fundamental officers among our comrades and followers. It abolished some of our too protective mass-organization.

About March or April of 1949, because of fast democratic development in China, the Chinese could see the picture clearer and clearer and had more courage to side with us. Many progressive followers then took an active part in our work.... It (CB) decided to pick up our disconnected red officer. It decided to alliance with the masses and to develop our work among the masses in a more systematic way. Our provincial organizations, except in one place, are not well stabilized. A certain branch organization changed three times within one year, causing a great trouble to our different activities. There are several comrades not attending regular meetings. Many of our units do not have a regular and stabilized meeting system. The system of fee collection is not stabilized yet. The comment and self-reflection (criticism and self-appraisal) system is not well established. Most of the members of our party came from the small-bourgeoisie class, thus showing the bad characteristic of connection, non-firmness, non-union, causing our party to fall under a seriously unhealthy condition. Following the attack in October 1948, and the effect of retreating "red officers", our party was facing the danger of collapse. Fortunately, with the fast encouraging development of a new democratic revolution in China, with the proper guidance and direction under the Central Political Bureau and Chinese Directive Board, with toll by all of us, we have saved our party from a state of confusion.

- 15 From the above it is evident that the Chinese Party went deeply underground in October 1948. There is no further information regarding the "Unson Case" but it is evident that it had far-reaching effects on the CB. The previously quoted statement of the SEC to the effect that "extreme underground and aversionism" was prevalent in the CB seems to be well substantiated.

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\* ~~Comment.~~ Recent reports on the activities of the Hua Chi, or Hwa Chi, a Chinese guerrilla organization in the Philippines, some units of which served with wartime units of the Hukbalahap, have included

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25X1A \*\* ~~Comment.~~ This Tagalog expression probably means smuggled, as it is used here.

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Comment. As of 7 October 1950, Regional Command 2 (RECO 2) included western Pangasinan west of the National Highway, Zambales, Bataan, Tarlac, Zambales, and the Mount Arayat area.

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